

uyFriday, May 4, 12

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This was not only a case of the “fait malaccompli” model, for K. Both exhibited the gambling-with-catastrophe model, which so often (almost always?) precedes actual catastrophe! Though not in this case—one of them won, the other suffered a political disaster but neither, ultimate global catastrophe—but the latter was more than possible. It was really a fairly likely outcome (not, perhaps, odds-on), given the two gambles (with JFK in ignorance of key elements, not aware of the extreme risks).

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Crazy unless: he took new steps to deter. He had a winning card: the tac nucs, with warheads; and the 40,000 Sov troops (when did they debark?) He could have revealed these as soon as they arrived—privately, to JFK, to allow him to climb



down from his commitment! Or publicly, to prevent pressure on JFK to carry out his warning. And he could go to the Security Council immediately, himself! (With indications of possible invasion of Cuba!) (He's not asking them to intervene, but to accept his lawful measures of defense of an ally, and to restrain the US! He could have preempted and reversed the tables on Stevenson!

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All in all, it was a reckless gamble, bordering on a long shot—**arguably crazy**, given the stakes (not just of backdown—which he seems not to have considered!—but of escalation).

Let me make that stronger: It **was** crazy (though it **could** have worked, against JFK: in fact, it came close, almost did work) to believe that (it was not "too" likely that) an American president would not discover the movement before it was a "fait accompli" and that he would not (be compelled to) take strong action, however illegal and dangerous.

It was on the order of (and closely related to) the **crazy** estimate of K's general that the missiles would not be discovered by overhead recon, without camouflage, among "the palm trees." (Discovery **was** close to certain, well before the election: especially given K's unexplained decision not to use the SAMs against the U-2, and not to delay installation of the missiles until the SAMs were operational).

I want to introduce the concept of "crazy, mad" choices—not all of which are meant to look mad!—as a category in analysis. As distinct from merely inadvertent, or poorly informed, or unreasoned, or non-optimal choices. There is not only the "political uses of (the appearance of) madness." There is "ordinary madness." (Not "clinical" in the individuals.)

Compare: C-I, the Bay of Pigs: the expectation of a general uprising in Cuba as a result of the Bay of Pigs was crazy (for those who held it: a different set, perhaps, from those who predicted it).

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JCS hope or belief that JFK would use US forces rather than lose, despite his verbal commitment to them (see LBJ in VN) was not crazy: it was even likely: but wrong. But that would have landed us in the soup (of VN) (although, on an island near us). JFK was not wrong, nor LBJ, in resisting.

Likewise, the expectation of assassination of Castro as a useful element; or of a fake attack on Guantanamo (or a Northwoods-type attack on a US ship: was that contemplated? Perhaps not, given the “provocation” expected of an impending defeat of the US-supported attackers without US intervention (as planned for Mongoose). Was not US intervention seen by the CIA as essential to success, as by EGL on Mongoose? JFK’s ruling that out should have aborted the plan; but they banked on his reversing himself: which he did not do in VN, or, in the end, in Cuba II. None of these were crazy expectations: but they were gambles, arguably long-shots; and they all lost.

It was the overall venture, relying on the first two beliefs, that was crazy (including the belief that it could be covert, with the US hand hidden or deniable).

General rule here: Something may look crazy; and probably is, if it looks that way; **yet** have calculations behind it, including some guesses and reasoning that are both esoteric and not entirely wrong or unrealistic, some unacknowledged motives that are “human,” not unusual, some not even discreditable, others discreditable but not uncommon; **yet** to discover these (perhaps long after the events) does not necessarily mean that the effort was not crazy, after all! Highly reasoned and motivated courses by generally reasonable people can be and often are, **crazy**! (See escalation in Vietnam in 1965! And Nixon’s strategy!)

This is not only for the public, voters, Congress to know, as a strong hypothesis. It is for the president to know, confronting allies and opponents! Not only “terrorists.” Of course, this possibility is asserted and exploited by those who want large “deterrent, retaliatory” forces; and who also want to use them for extended deterrence (counting on the opponents to know this about the US!)

Yet there are contradictions in their estimates: they assume that the opponent may be mad—yet deterrable (AJW: We want to make FS an act of madness for our opponent; yet we need forces for these that presume considerable madness in the opponent (a mere 20-40 million dead might not deter him: he’s almost Hitler, though Hitler probably could not have been deterred at all). Yet (JCS, not AJW): we want him to believe us mad, in NATO (or with FU threats elsewhere), and for him not to be mad enough to test that.

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premises and priorities leading to a continuously crazy result in terms of risks (both possible outcomes and likelihoods and uncertainties), ordinary madness of an extreme though not unprecedented sort, armed with unprecedented weapons foretelling an unprecedented and final outcome.

Ironically, some of the choices made by both JFK and K were less crazy than they appeared to be at the time (though some, unknown till much later, were even crazier, especially by K)—but the predicament they led to, the gambles they were making toward the end, were even worse, more reckless, more dangerous, than either of them knew at the time, nor any one else for 25 years (or later, with submarines; or now with my revelation on RFK).



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McN  
Ferguson

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11:30 AM  
3-19-15

\*

F.M.A.

K/T

DPP

(Dolan  
Question)

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webster  
he did, win

K/T = D.A.? (Dolan Question)

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*l-o-c (Castro!)  
Navy - American*

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UNLESS PLANNED RIGHT DIFFERENTLY

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long cake-walk

spread of discovery (of US, in ~~the~~ ...)

the one planned case



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Congress

Oct. 22-11

Walden

VN:

MCGB - "another 100K"

JCS - prevail

CBS - spec.

N -

House & Senate

Neo-cons / Wall St. / subprime (S&L; banking; dot-com)

Neo-cons: Iraq - ME

Iran

Afghanistan

- Madison; 3rd Party 2012

- Deng Xiaoping, evolution, old Earth

- 9-11 Truthers

- WWI

- S.B.

- New and even: SLOP FU & Europe

C-4

10-2(-1)

Madison T. Perry

[all over threats vs. NWS

or all of NWS?]

Has been used.

A disturb me

as the basis of FU threats?

Is this 'word' or not?

FU as basis

Can appeal to leaders.

as US policy

in 1958-59:

Can work.

(when nothing else can!)

\* Threat it

And be be

May be used against us.

totally bluff!

Missile gap!

" " "

of 'us'

its risks:

threat is legitimized

threat is perceived

Commitments are made

(bluff is not revealed

to subordinates, allies)

can be triggered "inadvertently"

may confront "word"/commitment/

mistakenly opponent

may explode, be carried out:

and it is word to commit

(may or may not be word to threaten)

Strategic

X

[Unintentionally: rational actor may not choose to

reveal it, thereby it ("too word" for allies, commitments?)]



C-II

10-21-11

thought the  
coveralls  
+ brief about  
a principal  
motives for it

JFK it al were not crazy to believe  
there was no chance K would (or could)  
do what he did —

not to ignore serious means

— It was crazy of K to think he could  
get away with it (without — or with —  
a high chance of blowing up the world) —

— Although he almost did get away  
with it & (at high risk)

JFK it al was  
wrong about this —  
unimaginative

— and he could have <sup>used to suggest ideas, acts, missions</sup> won, if he had  
done it better, in rather obvious ways:  
(without much risk of explosion)

— but it had to be done just right —  
the chance this could happen seems low —  
and the risk of uncontrolled actions  
& explosion was greater.

McC... "no risk" — because K & JFK were  
determined as to let it happen — yet they  
allowed uncontrolled actions to prevent, of  
which they were aware and could (at a  
cost & effort) have stopped.